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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-T AsFR OF JonLy HEW PROPERTY
MADE IN COmwaPLATION OF DEATH OR AccolWPANIE BY RE-NTON
OF LIER INTE1EsTS-Heasty v. United States, 370 F.2d 525 (10th
Cir. 1966).
In Heasty v. United States,' the decedent George Creekmore
acquired several tracts of land supplying the entire consideration
for each purchase. Subsequently, he conveyed this land to himself
and his wife as joint tenants. Two years later, Creekmore and his
wife transferred their interests, in fee, to their daughters and
grandchildren reserving for themselves a life estate, with right of
survivorship. The necessary gift tax was paid. This transfer was
sufficient to sever the joint ownership under the applicable Kansas
and Oklahoma state property laws. When Mrs. Creekmore died in
1952, no estate tax was payable as her gross estate was less than
60,000 dollars. However, when Mr. Creekmore died eight years
later, the Commissioner included the full value of the reality in his
gross estate and assessed taxes thereon under section 2036.2
The Commissioner based his assessment on the supposition that
under section 2036, Creekmore was the transferor, for estate tax
purposes, of the interest that would have otherwise been taxable to
him under section 2040 had the property been held jointly at the
time of his death. The Kansas Federal District Court granted the
Creekmore estate a refund. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Although both courts held that
Creekmore's interest in the transferred property was includable in
his estate under section 2036, they determined that the "interest"
and "transfer" taxed by that section were to be determined by
reference to applicable state property law. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reasoned that since a joint tenant could, under
Kansas and Oklahoma property law, convey or sever no more than
a one-half interest in jointly held property without the consent of
1 370 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1966).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 provides in part that: "(a) General
rule-the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth),
by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for
any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any
period which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from,
the property ....
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the other tenant,3 only a one-half interest could have been trans-
ferred by Creekmore and one-half was therefore properly includ-
able in his gross estate.
4
Section 20405 treats property held jointly at the time of the
tenant's death 6 as if it belonged entirely to the tenant who has
supplied the consideration for its original purchase.7 Thus where
the property is taxable under section 2040 the prior transfer to the
non-contributing tenant is deemed sufficiently testamentary to
3 Of special interest to Nebraska lawyers is the article on severance
of jointly held property at Comment, Estate Planning and the Sever-
ance of Joint Tenancies In Nebraska, 43 NEB. L. REv. 587 (1964).
4 The tax advantages of this interpretation of state property law are at
once apparent. The exact amount by which a decedent's estate tax
may be reduced will depend, of course, on a variety of factors, not the
least of which is the potential gift tax consequences of such a sever-
ance. However, as an example, assume that H has an anticipated
adjusted gross estate of $120,000, consisting solely of property held
jointly with his wife. In that situation a severance of the joint owner-
ship during life would not reduce estate taxes at all if it were intended
that the wife should get the whole estate. In that case, the exemption
and marital deduction would be sufficient to free the whole estate
from taxation. However, if H's anticipated adjusted gross estate had
been $240,000, the exemption and marital deduction would have freed
only $180,000 from taxation. Here severance of jointly owned property,
during life, with H's one-half retained life interest going to the wife
at his death, would free the whole $240,000 from taxation.
5 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2040. The material portions of this section
provide that: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants
by the decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the entirety by
the decedent and spouse,... except such part thereof as may be shown
to have originally belonged to such other person and never to have
been received or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth .... "
6 There is little doubt that section 2040 applies only to those interests
held jointly at the time of death. This construction appears from the
plain language of the statute and is specifically set out in Treas. Reg.
65, § 20.2040-1 (a) (1965). In addition, this restriction on the appli-
cability of section 2040 has been given wide recognition by the courts.
In United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939), the United States
Supreme Court specifically stated that by severance of a joint tenancy
during life, a taxpayer could avoid the application of what is now
section 2040. See also Glaser v. United States, 306 F.2d 57, 60 (7th
Cir. 1962) and Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657, 659
(9th Cir. 1949).
7 For an examination of the estate tax consequences where joint prop-
erty is held at the time of the contributing decedent's death see
Comment, Problems of Estate and Gift Taxation of Joint Ownership
Interests, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1205, 1211-12 (1963).
CASENOTES
warrant the adoption of an estate tax construction of the decedent's
property interest. This estate tax concept is, of course, distinct from
the decedent's interest as defined by state property law concepts.8
In Heasty, the government urged the court to apply a federal
estate or "tax substance" construction of "transfer" and "interest"
as taxed in section 2036. It reasoned that both sections 2040 and
2036 were aimed at preventing easy avoidance of estate tax conse-
quences by transfers that were substantially testamentary in char-
acter and that these sections should be read together to effectuate
this common taxing policy. Thus the government argued that since
Creekrnore would have been taxed under section 2040 on the full
value of the real estate had he died prior to the transfer to his
daughters and grandchildren, he should not, merely because he
made a testamentary transfer of only one-half of the property under
state property law, be allowed to escape full inclusion under section
2036. Therefore, the government urged the court to interpret the
"interest" and "transfer" taxed by section 2036 as being the "inter-
est" that would have been taxed under section 2040 had the subse-
quent transfer not occurred.9
The government has advanced similar arguments in situations
where jointly held property was severed by a transfer made in
contemplation of death and therefore taxable under section 2035.
However, in neither instance has the government's position met
with much success.10
8 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
9 Alternatively it has been argued in severance cases arising under
section 2036 that even though there has been a severance of the jointly
owned property, the resulting retained life estate with survivorship
is in substance, if not in form, merely a continuation of the joint
interest. It has been pointed out that in these situations the contribut-
ing tenant maintains the same degree of enjoyment and control as he
had prior to the transfer. Therefore it is urged that the substantial
reality of the result is sufficient to warrant imposition of estate tax
on the whole estate under section 2036. Certainly the transaction is
no less testamentary than the transfer into joint tenancy in itself. The
ripening of the noncontributing tenant's interest still depends on the
pivotal event of the prior death of the contributing tenant. See Glaser
v. United States, 306 F.2d 57, 60 (7th Cir. 1962).
10 This basic issue was thought to have been settled in the early case of
Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949). In
Sullivan, the contributing decedent held property jointly with his wife.
The joint ownership was severed by contract, transferring the respec-
tive interests to the decedent's son in contemplation of the decedent's
death. The court held that what is now section 2040 was applicable
only to property held jointly at the time of the contributing decedent's
death and found that the "interest" taxed by what is now section 2035
was to be determined by reference to the applicable state property
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Notably, the only evidence that the government's view has ever
been adopted in a severed joint ownership situation is found in the
Nebraska Federal District Court case of Harris v. United States."
There, in holding the entire value of property includable in the
contributing decedent's gross estate where the joint ownership
was severed in contemplation of death, the court seemed to entirely
avoid the issue that is central to Heasty. In Heasty the court focused
its attention on the relationship between section 2036 and section
2040. The dominate inquiry in Heasty was whether the "interest"
taxed under section 2036 was to be given an estate tax construction
giving credence to the underlying policy of these sections or
whether it was to be restricted in scope to the interest that the
decedent transferred under state property law. The Harris court,
however, made no inquiry into the relationship between sections
2035 and 2040. Instead, after referring only briefly to the effects of
section 2040, the court based its opinion on the apparent supposition
that section 2035 was, by itself, sufficiently broad to warrant inclu-
sion of the full value of the property in the contributing decedent's
gross estate.
Harris reaches a result that is not only contra to the decided
weight of authority, but which is conspicuously devoid of any defini-
tive rationale. Harris, therefore, seems to lend little support to the
government's argument that if a jointly owned property is severed
either in contemplation of death or with retention of life interests,
section 2035 or section 2036 should be read together with section 2040.
law. Therefore the court included only one-half of the value of the
property in the decedent's gross estate. See Note, Joint Tenancy and
Estate Tax Avoidance: A Widening Loophole For Transfers In Con-
templation of Death, 66 YALE L.J. 142 (1956) and Wright, Transfers of
Joint Property In Contemplation of Death, 55 McH. L. REv. 1 (1956).
Sullivan was widely accepted. The decision was extended to trans-
fers of property held in tenancy by the entirety in Estate of Borner v.
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 584 (1953). But cf. Comment, Problems of
Estate and Gift Taxation of Joint Ownership Interests, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1205, 1217 (1963). In addition, Sullivan has recently been
adopted by the seventh circuit in a section 2036 severance situation,
Glaser v. United States, 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962). See also Estate
of Brockway v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 489 (1952); Carnall v. Com-
missioner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955); and Baltimore National Bank v. United
States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D.C. Md. 1955).
The Sullivan rule, though specifically limited to its precise facts,
was even included in the formulation of the estate regulations under
the 1954 Code. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(d), 21 Fed. Reg. 7879
(1956). However, the proposed regulation was deleted in the final
promulgation.
11 193 F. Supp. 736 (D.C. Neb. 1961).
CASENOTES
These sections must be read together, the Commissioner contends,
if the "interest" taxed by those sections is to have a federal estate
tax construction which includes the entire amount taxable under
section 2040 had the subsequent transfer not have taken place. The
weight of Harris as authority is particularly questionable in view
of the decision in Heasty.2
In pursuing this argument in Heasty, the government relied on
United States v. O'Malley13 and United States v. Allen 4 as authori-
tative support for its position. In O'Malley, the United States
Supreme Court disregarded traditional property law concepts and
applied a federal estate tax concept to the "interest" taxed under
section 2036. However, it is significant that the court in O'Malley
was not faced with a determination of the interrelation of section
2040 with either section 2035 or section 2036. O'Malley concerned
only the application of the specific statutory language of section
2036 as it applied to a life interest retained in property owned
entirely by a single decedent transferor. The Court held that
accumulated earnings of trust property, over which the decedent
retained the power to designate beneficiaries, were includable in
the decedent's gross estate under section 2036. The Court carefully
distinguished this holding from section 2035 situations in which
there has been a completed inter vivos transfer. Certainly, O'Malley
does not seem to offer any compelling reason for adopting the
government's position.15
Allen, 6 however, stands in a different posture. Though the
factual context of Allen is certainly distinguishable from that of
Heasty the essential issue is precisely the same. In Allen, the Tenth
Circuit determined that in such situations the "interest" taxed
under section 2035 was the interest that would have been included
had the transfer not occurred. In so doing the court clearly seemed
to conclude that section 2035, section 2036, and presumably section
2040 were interrelated sections which should be read together to
12 Gradwohl, Estate Taxation of Joint Tenancies Severed In Contempla-
tion of Death, 10 NEB. S. B. J. 115 (1961). In fact, as of this writing,
Harris has not been cited as authority by any court.
13 383 U.S. 627 (1965).
14 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
15 The court in O'Malley found that in the section 2036 situation the
grantor retains an interest in the property or in its income and that his
death is the significant step in effectuating the transfer which began
inter vivos but which becomes effective only at his demise. This is in
contrast to the section 2035 situation where the court considers the
taxable event to be a completed inter vivos transfer which is in no way
dependent on the grantor's death.
16 293 F.2d 916.
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effectuate a common taxing policy. In fact, prior to Heasty many
commentators pointed to Allen as positive evidence of the Tenth
Circuit's intent to reach a similar result when confronted with
the Heasty type situation.'7
In Allen the decedent transferred property, which she alone
owned in fee, to a trust and retained a three-fifths life interest in the
income. Shortly before her death she sold the retained life interest
(then having an actuarial value of 135,000 dollars) to her son for
140,000 dollars. The court read what are now section 2035 and
section 2036 together and construed the "interest" taxed under
section 2035 in a federal estate tax sense. Thus the court found
that in order to constitute "full and adequate consideration" and
thereby remove the transfer from taxation under section 2035, the
decedent's son would have had to have paid an amount equal to
the interest which would have been included in the decedent's
gross estate under section 2036 had the transfer not been made. This
would have amounted to the value of three-fifths of the corpus of
the trust, or about 900,000 dollars. By this rationale the court found
that the full 900,000 dollars (three-fifths of the corpus) was properly
includable in the decedent's gross estate even though the interest
that the decedent had transferred, measured by traditional property
concepts, was worth at most 135,000 dollars.
The Allen court stated that:
It does not seem plausible, however, that Congress intended to
allow such an easy avoidance of the taxable incidence befalling
reserved life estates. This result would allow a taxpayer to reap
the benefits of property for his lifetime and, in contemplation of
death, sell only the interest entitling him to the income, thereby
removing all of the property which he has enjoyed from his gross
estate. Giving the statute a reasonable interpretation, we cannot
believe this to be its intendment.' 8
In Heasty, however, the Tenth Circuit aligned itself with the
earlier decisions of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and distin-
guished its earlier decision in Allen.19
Apparently recognizing the policy that a taxpayer may arrange
his affairs as he choses and may by his actions remove his entire
17 Cohen, Treasury Views On Current Questions, 104 J. TRUSTS & EST. 13
(1965); Polasky, Current Tax Developments, 103 J. TRUSTS & EST. 253,
255 (1964); Young, CA-7 Follows Sullivan In Severance of Joint
Tenancies; Sets Stage For High Court Review, 17 J. TAXATION 296,
298 (1962).
IS 293 F.2d at 918.
19 Note 9 supra, Glaser v. United States, 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962);
Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949).
CASENOTES
estate from the scope of the taxing acts; 20 the Heasty court seems
to echo the conclusions of the earlier Tax Court decisions holding
that, if in fact, such transactions are not within the present statutory
scheme, the remedy must come from Congress and not from the
courts. 21
While the Heasty court did not overrule Allen, it certainly
limited the application of that case to its particular facts. Although
Heasty talks in terms of accepting alternative constructions of the
"transfer," referred to in section 2036, its actual inquiry focused on
the "interest" that was in fact transferred and, therefore, taxable
under that section. There was no doubt but that a transfer of prop-
erty had taken place. It was the interest held prior to the transfer
that was significant and not the transfer itself. Thus the distinction
that was crucial to the Heasty holding was that the transfer which
resulted in the severance of the jointly held property was made
by two persons instead of one; and more basically that the original
ownership interest of the joint property was vested not in just one
individual as in Allen or O'Malley, but in two distinct individuals.
The court in Heasty stated that: "So also would the Allen case
stand in a different posture if one-half the corpus of the trust had
been 'transferred' by some one other than the decedent."
22
In evaluating the court's distinction, it is interesting that a
transfer into joint ownership is deemed sufficiently testamentary to
justify imposition of estate taxation under section 2040,2 and that
a transfer with retention of a life estate or in contemplation of
death is considered sufficiently testamentary to justify taxation
under section 2035 or section 2036.24 Yet, when these same trans-
actions are made in succession, by applying the Heasty rationale,
one-half of the property loses its testamentary character and is
insulated from the application of any estate tax construction of the
"interest" taxed under either section 2035 or section 2036.
This distinction may be explained by the contention that these
sections are simply not broad enough to reach jointly held property
which has been severed prior to death even though the severance
was in contemplation of death or accompanied with the reservation
20 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); Pacific Southwest
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1942).
21 Estate of Broackway v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 498 (1952).
22 Heasty v. United States, 370 F.2d 525, 528-29 (10th Cir. 1966).
2 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
24 See generally INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2035 and 2036 and Note,
Joint Tenancy and Estate Tax Avoidance: A Widening Loophole For
Transfers In Contemplation of Death, 66 YALE L.J. 142 (1956).
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of a life interest. It is at least arguable that the legislative history
does not justify the construction of these sections in the light of
any overriding taxing policy.25 Alternatively, it has been suggested
that the transfer into joint tenancy is a completed inter vivos
transfer which creates new and distinctive rights to the property in
the tenants and that, therefore, its subsequent severance requires
the application of state property law concepts.2 However, none of
these approaches seem theoretically adequate to justify the Heasty
distinction, particularly in view of the approach adopted in Allen
and the broad taxing policy which underlies sections 2040, 2035,
and 2036.2
Nevertheless, it is clear that as a result of the Heasty decision
the intermediate ownership arising in the joint tenancy situation
is sufficient to insulate the "interest" taxed by either section 2035
or 2036 from being given any federal estate tax interpretation.
It is apparent that the distinction which Heasty draws does not
rest upon any grounds peculiar to section 2036 but is based, instead,
on the nature of the ownership interests held prior to the taxable
transfer.28 Therefore the Heasty rationale would seem applicable
to any transfer of jointly owned property whether accompanied by
retention of a life estate or made in contemplation of death. In
the section 2035 situation then, Heasty would compel like estate tax
results. Allen would not affect the viability of the Heasty distinc-
tion in situations where the severance was made in contemplation
of death, as the very basis of the Heasty distinction is contrary to
such a contention.
25 Certainly Congressional intent that these sections should be read
together to effectuate a broad underlying taxing policy is far from
conclusive. See Wright, Transfers of Joint Property In Contemplation
of Death, 55 MfcH. L. REv. 1 (1956). In addition it is notable that in
the Code, specific provisions have been established for similar con-
tingencies with respect to section 2041. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041.
26 Comment, Loopholes and Ambiguities of Section 2036, 65 MIxC. L.
REV. 508, 513 (1967).
27 It is interesting to note that the Federal Estate Tax Regulations
specifically adopt a federal estate tax construction of the interest taxed
by section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Although Regu-
lation 20.2035-1(b) limits this interpretation to transfers which would
otherwise be taxable under sections 2036, 2037, or 2038, the mere fact
that such an approach is taken with respect to those sections militates
against the Heasty type rationale.
28 Woolfolk, New Case Points Out Route To Prevent Entire Transferred
Joint Tenancies From Being Taxed, 26 J. TAXATiON 246 (1967).
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In addition, in view of the earlier cases, it would seem that
Heasty is not limited to joint tenancy situations but extends as
well to severance of property held in tenancy by the entirety.
For these reasons it appears that Heasty has eliminated the
previous uncertain estate tax consequences of severing jointly
owned property. In Heasty the Tenth Circuit has aligned itself
with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and firmly reinforced the
refusal of the courts to adopt an estate tax construction of "interest"
as taxed by either section 2035 or section 2036 in severed joint
ownership situations. Thus, in the absence of an amendment to the
federal estate tax statutes, it appears that estate planners may
continue with confidence to advise severance of jointly held prop-
erty. 0
L. Bruce Wright '69
29 See note 9 supra.
80 The Commissioner, apparently encouraged by the results in Harris
and Allen withdrew his prior acquiescence to the earlier Tax Court
decisions and entered a nonacquiescence to those decisions. INT. REv.
BuLL. 1962-20 May 14, 1962. However, it would appear that the gov-
ernment does not intend to continue to litigate these cases. It was
stated recently in Tax Management Tidbits that: "The Chief Counsel,
Tax Management is advised, will not litigate in the Tax Court the
question of whether the full value of formerly jointly owned property
is includable in a decedent's gross estate where, shortly prior to death,
the decedent and the co-tenant either transferred or severed such
property. ... However, this question will be litigated in the district
courts if a refund suit is brought, but apparently the taxpayer will
prevail on this issue (citations omitted) .. . ." TAx MAAGEMA~M T
INcoRPoRATED, TAx MANAGEMENT TiDiTs 15 (1968).
